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HIDING THE BALL: THE NEED FOR ABANDONING THE
IMMEDIATE CUSTODIAN RULE FOR WRITS OF HABEAS
CORPUS FILED BY IMMIGRANT DETAINEES
MICHAEL BELAND* AND AMANDA LESHER OLEAR**
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent
American response to threats posed by global terrorist networks have
caused the United States to reconsider its domestic laws. Perhaps no
other area of domestic policy has been as affected as immigration law.'
While the Executive and Legislative branches exercise plenary power
2
over immigration law in peacetime, they have nearly unfettered
control over this area of law during periods of war.3 As a result, there
is greater potential for governmental abuse of its power over
immigration law.
Notwithstanding the government's increased power over
immigration law in wartime, immigrants are still entitled to basic
protections from abuse of this power under the U.S. Constitution. One
of these basic protections is the writ of habeas corpus. Since the dawn
of the Republic, the writ of habeas corpus has safeguarded a prisoner's
right to a judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of his or her detention.4
If a prisoner's detention is deemed unlawful, the writ offers remedies
to the prisoner, such as release or a new hearing. 5  The writ also
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like to dedicate this article to Professors Jana Singer and Katherine Vaughns of the University
of Maryland School of Law for their support and inspiration.
1. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
2. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to exercise at
any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the
country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of
anyone.
Id.
3. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that in cases of "terrorism
or other special circumstances . . . special arguments might be made . . . for heightened
[judicial] deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of
national security.").
4. The writ of habeas corpus is explicitly provided for in Article I of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 cl. 2.
5. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies §§ 6, 65 (2004).
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ensures prisoners' adequate procedural due process under the test
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.6
A writ of habeas corpus must be directed "to the person having
custody of the person detained.",7 To determine who has "custody,"
courts have devised the "immediate custodian rule." However, the
way in which the immediate custodian rule is currently applied in the
immigration context significantly limits immigrant detainees' ability to
challenge their detention and infringes on their due process rights.
Evidence shows that the immediate custodian rule, combined with the
Department of Homeland Security's unfettered discretion in the
transfer of detainees to contractor rural jails, places immigrants at a
significant disadvantage in pursuing legitimate habeas corpus claims.
8
As a result of the rule, habeas corpus petitions are heard in courts that
bear no relation to the jurisdictions in which the grounds for removal
were first determined, and the immigrant detainee is often heard
without the assistance of counsel, leaving the immigrant at a distinct
disadvantage in any proceedings she might obtain and largely stripping
those proceedings of their meaning.
9
This article seeks to demonstrate that the "immediate custodian
rule" must be abandoned in the case of immigrant detainees l seeking
to file habeas corpus petitions. Instead, the Attorney General should
be identified as the appropriate respondent-custodian in petitions for
writs of habeas corpus brought by immigrant petitioners. Part I of this
article will briefly explain the history and function of the writ of
habeas corpus in American jurisprudence. Part II will describe the
immediate custodian rule this article argues should be overturned with
respect to immigrant detainees. In Part III, this article will compare
Roman v. Ashcroft" and Armentero v. I.N.S.,12 two divergent federal
appellate cases addressing the issue of the proper respondent in cases
in which immigrant petitioners file writs of habeas corpus. Finally, in
Part IV, this article will assert that the decision in Armentero reaches
6. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (stating that the test involves three factors: the petitioner's
interest, the protection provided by the added procedure against erroneous deprivation of that
interest, and the government's interest against providing the additional procedure).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. Id.
10. This Article argues solely for the abandonment of the Immediate Custodian rule
with respect to immigrants and will not focus on the rule's application regarding non-
immigrants.
11. 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied en banc, No. 02-3253, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1951 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2004).
12. 340 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.2003).
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the proper conclusion on the issue that should be followed when
considered in light of the due process test set forth in Mathews. In
concluding, this article will emphasize the need for abandoning the
immediate custodian rule and for allowing immigrant detainees to file
writs of habeas corpus against the Attorney General, regardless of the
deference accorded the political branches of government during times
of war.
I. AN EXPLANATION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The right to the protection of physical liberty guaranteed by the
writ of habeas corpus has been heralded as "[t]he most important
human rights provision in the Constitution."' 13  Therefore, when
approaching the question of whether an immigrant detainee may file a
writ against the Attorney General as respondent-custodian, thereby
abandoning the immediate custodian rule, one should not fail to heed
the significance that the writ of habeas corpus holds in the Anglo-
American legal system.
The writ of habeas corpus is explicitly protected under Article I
of the U.S. Constitution: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."'14 The writ of habeas corpus is a
procedure that provides a judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of
detention' 5 and awards remedies, such as release or a new hearing, if
the detention is found to be unlawful. 16 The current statute authorizing
the issuance of writs of habeas corpus states that the writ is to be
directed "to the person having custody of the person detained."'
' 7
The foundation of the writ of habeas corpus pre-dates the
establishment of the United States and the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution. The writ has its roots in England, where it acquired an
association with the principle of due process of law derived from the
Magna Carta.' 8 In England, the writ of habeas corpus was considereda vehicle for bringing a person before a court to facilitate proceedings
13. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.
L. REv. 143 (1952).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
15. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961, 969 (1998).
16. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies §§ 6, 65 (2004).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).
18. IX SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 111-12 (3d ed. 1944).
2004]
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in which his presence was required. 19 Important for the purposes of
this article, the writ was used in England to enable the court to "require
a custodian to produce a detained person and explain the reason for the
detention so that the court could decide whether the detention was
lawful."20
Four states had already provided for habeas corpus guarantees
in their constitutions before the U.S. Constitution was ratified in
1787.21 Although the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 did not
name the writ explicitly, it provided "[t]hat every freeman, restrained
of his liberty, is entitled to a remedy, to inquire into the lawfulness
thereof, and to remove the same, if unlawful; and that such remedy
ought not to be denied or delayed., 22 The Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780, on the other hand, asserted one's right to the writ of habeas
corpus and supplied "the most direct model for the federal Suspension
Clause,"23 by stating:
[t]he privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus
shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth, in the most
free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample manner, and
shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a
limited time, not exceeding twelve months.
24
The writ of habeas corpus has always been looked upon as a
"human right," 25 not merely a right held by citizens of a particular
state. England never restricted the use of the writ to the King's
subjects, nor has the United States limited its use to citizens.26
Although the federal government has nearly limitless control over
immigration law, 27 Article III courts remain resolute in their position
that immigrants should be able to file a writ of habeas corpus in
federal courts. 28 Therefore, although most immigration-related issues
19. R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 1-2 (1976).
20. Neuman, supra note 15, at 971 (citing Rollin C. Hurd, TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF
PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED
WITH IT: WITH A VIEW OF THE LAW OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES 144 (1 st ed. 1858).
21. Id. at 972.
22. N.C. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) art. XIII.
23. Neuman, supra note 15, at 972.
24. MASS. CONST. of 1780 (Part the Second) ch. VI, art. VII.
25. Chafee, supra note 13, at 144.
26. Neuman, supra note 15, at 989.
27. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
28. Neuman, supra note 15, at 989.
[VOL. 4:99
2004] ABANDONING THE IMMEDIATE CUSTODIAN RULE
29
are adjudicated by the executive branch, the writ is available to
immigrants and may be filed in the courts of the judicial branch,3 ° thus
demonstrating the importance of habeas corpus in our constitutional
system.
II. THE IMMEDIATE CUSTODIAN RULE
3 1
The U.S. statute detailing the proper use of the writ of habeas
corpus asserts that the writ is to be directed "to the person having
custody of the person detained., 32 This language is confusing, as it is
not clear how "custody" is to be defined. Since a court only has
jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition if it has personal jurisdiction
over the petitioner's custodian, the designation of "custody" is of great
importance. 33 In order to determine who is the proper custodian-and
thus the proper respondent in a habeas suit-courts have historically
analyzed who "has power over the petitioner."
34
The "immediate custodian" rule has been used to determine
35 36
who, in fact, has "power over the petitioner."35 In Vasquez v. Reno,
the First Circuit articulated how the immigrant custodian rule is
applied in the immigration context, explaining that the proper
[T]he Supreme Court preserved habeas inquiry into the lawfulness of
exclusion and deportation orders in the face of congressional efforts ... to
confer finality on those orders. The constitutionally required scope of
review, thus preserved, governed habeas inquiry into exclusion and
deportation orders until judicial review was expanded under the
Administrative Procedure Act in the 1950s.
Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 988.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions.").
31. The following description of the immediate custodian rule is not intended to provide
an exhaustive analysis of the rule's problems and how it negatively affects the justice given to
detained immigrants filing writs of habeas corpus. Instead, the purpose of the section is to
give the reader an understanding of the immediate custodian rule so that she will have a
stronger appreciation for the discussion of why the rule should be abandoned.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2003).
33. "The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon
the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody." Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973) (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564,
574 (1885)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
34. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1998). Courts have also considered
the convenience of the parties and the court. Id.
35. Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 693 (1st Cir. 2000).
36. Id. at 696.
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respondent in a habeas suit is "the individual having day-to-day
control over the facility in which [the immigrant] is being detained., 3 7
The First Circuit held that the proper respondent was the immigrant's
"true custodian" - the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
("INS") district director for Louisiana, and not the Attorney General.38
The immediate custodian rule, therefore, only recognizes the proper
respondent in a habeas suit as the individual who is the immediate or
direct custodian of the petitioner because he is the "person having
custody" over the petitioner under the habeas statute.3
9
Many courts also seem to favor the immediate custodian rule
over a broader interpretation of who should qualify as a "person
having custody" because of judicial efficiency. For example, in
Vasquez, the First Circuit said that the immediate custodian rule "is
clear and easily administered. 4 0 Courts suggest that the adjudication
of habeas corpus petitions filed by detained immigrants would
"become considerably more difficult to administer" if the courts were
to adopt a broader definition of the word custodian.4'
These words, though seemingly innocuous, discount the
realities of how detained immigrants are treated.42  Since the
immediate custodian rule generally requires immigrants to file their
writs of habeas corpus against either their warden or the DHS District
Director, it inevitably restricts the judicial forum to the district in
which the petitioner is imprisoned.43 Furthermore, it appears that the
Attorney General is using the immediate custodian rule as a means to
alienate immigrant detainees from fair and equitable access to the
justice system because prospective petitioners may, only file the writ
against the warden of their prison while having virtually no access to a
capable immigration attorney. In light of the deplorable treatment of
these detained immigrants seeking to have their claims heard in a fair
and equitable manner, it is questionable whether courts can continue to
37. Id.
38. Id. at 690.
39. Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[W]e consider it settled
beyond cavil that when a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus ... he must name as
the respondent the superintendent of the facility in which he is being held.").
40. Id. at 693.
41. Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied en banc, No. 02-
3253, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1951 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2004).
42. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
43. Vasquez, 233 F.3d at 691 (agreeing with other courts' reasoning that writs of habeas
corpus are "more logically directed to the person who does have day-to-day control and actual
physical custody, namely, the warden").
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justify the immediate custodian rule in the interest of judicial
expediency.
Fortunately, the courts have conceded that there may be
"extraordinary circumstances in which the Attorney General
appropriately might be named as the respondent to an alien habeas
petition."44  Unfortunately, there are few cases enunciating what, in
fact, constitutes "extraordinary circumstances." In Demjanjuk v.
Meese,45 the D.C. Circuit found an "extraordinary circumstance" when
the petitioner's attorneys did not know the location of the petitioner.
4 6
As a result, the D.C. Circuit asserted that it was appropriate for the
writ to be filed against the Attorney General. 47 In Chavez-Rivas v.
Olsen,48 the U.S. District Court of New Jersey found an "extraordinary
circumstance" in the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
ability to deny detained immigrants access to habeas relief by
transferring aliens to other jurisdictions as soon as they filed habeas
actions in a particular jurisdiction.49  Proving this type of
"extraordinary circumstance" is difficult; many courts seem to require
detainees to show that the government has used its transfer power in a
clear effort to frustrate habeas petitions, and are not willing to infer as
much from mere statistics about rates of transfer.5 °
III. COMPARING ROMAN AND ARMENTERO
The recent decisions in Roman v. Ashcroft 51 and Armentero v.
I.N.S.5' provide opposing answers to the question of whether the
44. Vasquez, 233 F.3d at 696.
45. 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
46. Id. at 1115-1116.
47. Id. at 1116.
48. 194 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D.N.J. 2002), writ of habeas corpus granted, in part, 207 F.
Supp. 2d 326 (D.N.J. 2002).
49. Id. at 374.
50. Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 326 (6th Cir.2003), cert. denied en banc, No. 02-
3253, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1951 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2004).
Regardless of whether either Roman or the government can provide
convincing statistics about the caseload of the Western District of
Louisiana, we do not believe that the possibility of an alien's removal
prior to the adjudication of his habeas corpus petition amounts to an
effective denial of the petitioner's opportunity to seek meaningful habeas
corpus relief
Id. at 327.
51. 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied en banc, No. 02-3253, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1951 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2004).
52. 340 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003).
2004]
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Attorney General is the proper respondent-custodian when a habeas
petition is filed by a detained immigrant. These diverging conclusions
by the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits may not
necessarily go to the U.S. Supreme Court for resolution.53 However,
these cases do illustrate the perspectives on each side of the debate.
Upon summarizing these cases, the appropriate analytical framework
will be in place for this article to cogently assert that the Ninth Circuit
correctly concluded that the Attorney General is the proper
respondent-custodian in petitions for writs of habeas corpus brought
by immigrant petitioners and that the immediate custodian rule should
be abandoned.
A. Roman v. Ashcroft
Julio E. Roman, a 46-year old native and citizen of the
Dominican Republic, had been a lawful permanent resident of the
United States since October 29, 1996, was married and had six U.S.
citizen children.54 Roman pleaded guilty in the Northern District of
Ohio to fraud and misuse of visas and social security numbers on
September 30, 1999. 55  He was sentenced to fifteen months of
imprisonment for these crimes, of which he served thirteen months.56
The INS later charged Roman with being removable from the United
States because of his federal convictions, and Roman was transferred
from a federal prison in Kentucky to an INS detention facility in the
Western District of Louisiana.57
In July 2000, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Roman
removable and statutorily ineligible for discretionary relief under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).58 The Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed the IJ's decision on appeal.59 Subsequently, Roman
filed a habeas petition, arguing that parts of the INA violated the Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.60 Rather than filing his petition
in the Western District of Louisiana, where he was detained at the time
of his filing, Roman filed his petition in the Northern District of Ohio,
53. As of this writing, no writs of certiorari have been filed in either case.
54. Roman, 340 F.3d at 316.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (stating that the immigration judge found Roman ineligible for relief under §
212(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)).
59. Id.
60. Roman, 340 F.3d at 316. "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is
the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976).
106 [VOL. 4:99
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where he formerly resided and where he was convicted of the crimes
that led to his removal. 61 Furthermore, Roman named the Attorney
General and various INS officials as the respondents in his petition.
6Z
The Northern District of Ohio concluded that it had personal
jurisdiction over the Attorney General and granted Roman a writ of
habeas corpus.63 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit
asserted that "Roman's action must be brought in the district court
having jurisdiction over 'the person having custody of the person
detained,"' and it vacated the district court's decision to grant habeas
corpus relief.
64
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit confined its analysis
to whether the Northern District of Ohio erred by finding personal
jurisdiction over the Attorney General, thereby enabling the Attorney
General to be named the appropriate respondent-custodian in Roman's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 65 In order to resolve this issue, the
court considered the immediate custodian rule and whether the case
introduced any "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify a
departure from the immediate custodian rule, thus affirming the
Northern District of Ohio's ruling to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the Attorney General.66
Upon reviewing the immediate custodian rule, the Sixth Circuit
asserted that "a detained alien filing a habeas corpus petition should
generally name as respondent the person exercising daily control over
his affairs. '67 The court stated that the person exercising daily control
over the affairs of a detained immigrant is either the warden of the
facility where the immigrant is detained, or the INS District Director
of the district where the immigrant is being detained.68  Whereas,
Roman asserted that the immediate custodian rule should not be
applied to immigrants filing writs of habeas corpus, thereby enabling
them to file against the Attorney General instead, the Sixth Circuit said
that it saw "no reason to apply a different rule for identifying a
petitioner's custodian depending on whether the petitioner is an alien
or a prisoner. '' 69 In support of its decision, the court analyzed the
61. Roman, 340 F.3d at 316.
62. Id. at 317.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 316 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2243).
65. Id. at 318.
66. Roman, 340 F.3d at 325.
67. Id. at 320.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 321.
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language of the habeas statute, which asserts that the writ "shall be
directed to the person having custody of the person detained,, 70 and
suggested that, from the language of the statute, it was clear that a
petitioner did not have a choice as to whom to name as a respondent;
in fact, only one person could hold such status.7'
In addition to relying upon the language of the habeas statute to
support its use of the immediate custodian rule, the Sixth Circuit also
asserted that the rule ensures the swift administration of justice. In
other words, by confining the potential respondent-custodians to a
smaller number through the immediate custodian rule, the courts
would not be burdened by so many of these petitions.72 Otherwise,
according to the court, a "regime" would be established in which
several jurisdictions would have personal jurisdiction over an
immigrant's "'custodians.' ' 73 In the court's view, such a "regime"
would inevitably create the fertile ground for vast amounts of forum-
shopping by potential petitioners.74
In Roman, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the use of the immediate
custodian rule as applied to detained immigrants, but recognized that
this rule could not be too rigid due to the nature of immigrant
detention and the relationship immigrants have with the Attorney
General. 75  The court stressed that the rules treating the immediate
custodian as the only proper respondent have not been applied in a
rigid fashion and that, furthermore, most courts using the rule have
noted exceptions to it as they have adopted it.76 The court discussed
two exceptions to the immediate custodian rule: first, the "Attorney
General as [c]ustodian, '' 77  and, second, "[e]xtraordinary
[c]ircumstances." 78
In the case of the Attorney General as custodian, the court said
it recognized that the Attorney General's relationship to prisoners
differs significantly from his relationship to detained immigrants.
79
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2003).
71. Roman, 340 F.3d at 321.
72. Id. at 322.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 323-25.
76. Roman, 340 F.3d at 322.
77. Id. at 323-25.
78. Id. at 325-27.
79. Id. at 324 ("Thus, the Attorney General continues to be in complete charge of the
proceedings leading up to the order directing the[] removal [of aliens] from the country and
has complete discretion to decide whether or not removal shall be directed.") (alteration in
original) (quoting Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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Therefore, according to the court, there were special occasions during
which the Attorney General would be the properly named custodian in
a writ filed by a detained immigrant when he otherwise would not be if
the petitioner were an ordinary prisoner. 80 Regardless of the court's
willingness to recognize this exception, it did nothing to explore or
describe it. Instead, the court merely said that the exception did not
apply to the case.
8
'
The Sixth Circuit also discussed the "extraordinary
circumstances" exception to the immediate custodian rule. In Roman,
the district court had determined that the naming of the Attorney
General as respondent-custodian was justified under the circumstances
because of the prospect that the petitioner could be removed to the
Dominican Republic before his habeas petition could be heard on the
merits. 82  The Sixth Circuit recognized that "[u]nder certain
extraordinary circumstances it may be necessary to depart from the
immediate custodian rule in order to preserve a petitioner's access to
habeas corpus relief."83 The court said that "[s]uch circumstances may
arise where a detainee does not have a realistic opportunity for judicial
review of his executive detention." 84 These circumstances could arise
when the immigrant is at an undisclosed location and the lawyers for
the petitioner did not know where to find him,85 or when the INS
attempts to deny immigrants "any meaningful opportunity" to seek
habeas corpus relief by transferring immigrants any time they file
habeas corpus petitions.
86
In the latter situation, the Attorney General could be named the
appropriate respondent-custodian because such a case "could be
adjudicated without interruption in the event of a transfer."87  The
court said that it might also allow the Attorney General to be the
respondent-custodian when excessive transfers occurred in an attempt
to quash justice.88  However, the court asserted that it was notinterested in any of Roman's statistics relating to transfers into the
80. Id. at 324-25.
81. Id. "The nature and scope of [these] circumstances remains to be determined." Id. at
325.
82. Roman, 340 F.3d at 325.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
86. Id. at 325-326 (citing Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 194 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 (D.N.J.
2002), writ of habeas corpus granted, in part, 207 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D.N.J. 2002)).
87. Id. at 326.
88. Roman, 340 F.3d at 326.
2004] 109
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Western District of Louisiana.89  Therefore, although the court said
that it might provide relief in the case of repeated transfers for
obstructionist purposes, its reluctance to consider Roman's evidence
seemed to slam the door on any way of proving such activity.
90
Because the Sixth Circuit did not believe any exceptions to the
immediate custodian rule existed, it vacated the district court's
granting of habeas relief to the Roman and stated that the Attorney
General was not the proper respondent-custodian in the case.
91
B. Armentero v. INS
Luis Armentero, a citizen of Cuba, arrived in the United States
in 1980 and, five years later, was convicted of rape by force in
California. 92 An IJ later held that Armentero was excludable from the
United States and ordered him deported.93  Because the INS was
unable to deport Armentero, 94 he was, essentially in government
detention for over ten years awaiting deportation. 95  In 2001,
Armentero filed a writ of habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, asserting that he was being
indefinitely detained in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment 96 and that the conditions of his detention amounted to
punishment that violated the Constitution.97  Armentero named the
INS as the only respondent.
98
At the time Armentero filed his petition, he was located a
detention facility in San Pedro, California.99 The INS subsequently
transferred him to a federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.
00
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California then
89. Id. at 327.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 329.
92. Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003).
93. Id.
94. Id. ("The INS was apparently unable to deport Armentero. In the ensuing years,
Armentero was released to a halfway house; detained once again by the INS after a new
conviction; paroled again; convicted of yet another crime; and detained once more by the
INS.").
95. Id.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .....
97. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1060.
98. Id. at 1059.
99. Id. at 1060.
100. Id.
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denied Armentero's petition without prejudice.' 0 1 Armentero appealed
the court's decision to the Ninth Circuit, in which neither party raised
the issue of whether Armentero had properly named the INS as
respondent in his habeas petition.'
0 2
Similar to the Sixth Circuit in Roman, the Ninth Circuit first
considered the habeas statute in order to determine against whom
Armentero could file his writ. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he
statute does not specify that the respondent named shall be the
petitioner's immediate physical custodian."'' 0 3 The court stated that in
order to better understand who the respondent should be in habeas
cases, it needed to look to the appropriate U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 10 4 Supreme Court case law, read as a whole, indicated
to the Ninth Circuit that the "concept of custodian is a broad one that
includes any person empowered to end restraint of a habeas
petitioner's liberty, not just the petitioner's on-site, immediate physical
custodian."'
0 5
The court then analyzed the pertinent Ninth Circuit case law. It
noted that although a petitioner's immediate custodian is generally the
proper respondent in habeas petitions,' °6 there are cases in which the
custodian requirement may be "flexibly interpreted to encompass other
custodians when it is efficient to do so."' 0 7 The court insisted that its
lack of case law on the matter-and the fact that the available cases
were so specific-enabled the court to make a determination without
being bound by any precedent.'
0 8
As a result of the lack of binding case law on the issue at handin Armentero, the court considered out-of-circuit cases addressin
immigration detainees. 109 The court first looked to Vasquez v. Reno,11°
in which the First Circuit held that the Attorney General was not an
appropriate respondent in a habeas action brought by an immigrant
detained in an INS detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana."'
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1061.
104. Id. Interestingly, for the purpose of comparison, the court in Roman did not seem to
consider the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of "immediate custodian" when it construed
the term as rigidly as it did.
105. Id. at 1064.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1064.
108. Id. at 1065.
109. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1065.
110, Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 2000).
111. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1065.
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Although the Vasquez court acknowledged the backlog of habeas
petitions filed by immigrants in the Western District of Louisiana, it
observed that Congress, not the courts, should redefine "custodian"
under the habeas statute to increase efficiency." 2 The First Circuit
also rejected the argument that the Attorney General was the proper
respondent in habeas cases simply because of his unique position as
the ultimate authority in matters of immigration." 
3
The Armentero court also considered the Second Circuit's
decision in Henderson v. INS.1 4 In Henderson, the Second Circuit did
not take a particular side on the issue of who was a proper respondent,
but did indicate that it is often appropriate for the Attorney General to
be named as such in the immigration context. 115 In Henderson, the
Second Circuit said that the Attorney General could be named the
proper custodian because of "Congress' statutory designation of the
Attorney General as legal custodian of criminal aliens and the
Attorney General's broad statutory power to detain aliens."" 6 This
enabled the court to assert that the Attorney General could be named
the proper respondent.
The Armentero court concluded that although a petitioner's
immediate physical custodian is typically a proper respondent in
traditional habeas petitions, the custodian requirement is "sufficiently
flexible to permit the naming of respondents who are not immediate
physical custodians if efficiency, practicality, and the interests of
justice so demand." ' 1 7 The court said that the varied circumstances
surrounding the detention of aliens demanded judicial flexibility
because detainees are held in a "host" of institutions ranging from
federal penitentiaries to county jails." 8 When the detainees are in state
and local jails, it is inefficient for a writ of habeas corpus to be
directed to a warden because his control over the immigration
detainees is merely contractual and the warden does not have the
power to release the detainees. 1
9
In rejecting the notion that the immediate custodian rule should
be applied rigidly, the court pointed to the high rate of transfer of
immigration detainees among detention centers across the country,
112. Id. at 1066.
113. Id.
114. 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
115. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1067.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1068.
118. Id.
119. Id..
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which renders the immediate custodian rule impractical and against the
interests of justice because a detainee has to restart his filing process
each time he moves to a new institution. 120 Furthermore, the high rate
of transfer, according to the court, makes it difficult for detainees to
have effective access to counsel. 12' Lastly, unlike the Sixth Circuit in
Roman, the Ninth Circuit took note of statistics that indicated that
certain district courts in areas with immigration centers have been
"flooded" with detainee habeas petitions. 22 The court stated that this
surge in petitions could threaten the ability of certain districts to
consider habeas petitions in a "reasonably prompt manner."'1 23
Due to the court's perceptions of the problems associated with
the immediate custodian rule in the context of immigration, it said that
the rule should not be applied to immigrant detainees. 124 It held that
the most appropriate respondent to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
brought by immigrant detainees, such as Armentero, is the "individual
in charge of the national government agency under whose auspices the
alien is detained"'125 or, in other words, the Attorney General.
IV. ARMENTERO PROPERLY ABANDONS THE IMMEDIATE CUSTODIAN
RULE AS REQUIRED BY THE DUE PROCESS TEST IN MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
In its most basic form, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the
immediate custodian rule in Armentero is one of procedural due
process, although the Ninth Circuit did not necessarily label it as
such. 126 Meaningful access to the full power of the writ of habeas
corpus adds an indispensable layer of procedural safeguard to a
process in which an individual's freedom is at stake. When the
immediate custodian rule in the immigration context is analyzed under
the procedural due process test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge,127
the need for abandoning the immediate custodian rule as a necessary
120. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1069.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1069.
124. Id. at 1071.
125. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1071.
126. "(O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due
Process Clause applies to all persons in the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 698 (2001) (citation omitted).
127. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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alteration to the procedural due process protections already guaranteed
to immigrant detainees becomes clear.
First, the Mathews test requires an examination of the
detainees' interest at stake in the detention and removal process.' 2 8 In
the immigration context, the interests are the swift adjudication of
immigrant detainee claims, the right to be free from indefinite
detention (in the United States or, after removal, in their country of
origin), and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that right. The second
prong of the Mathews test requires the identification of the
government's interest in requiring the application of the immediate
custodian rule apply. 129 In the immigration context, the government
has articulated an interest in preventing the expense of Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) resources on more proceedings prior to
removal. 130 This interest, however, appears minor when compared to
the basic interest of freedom that hangs in the balance. Finally, the
proposed alteration to the process is analyzed to determine its value in
ensuring that the adjudication of the detainees' interest is just. 3'
Permitting the detainee to name the Attorney General as the
respondent to her habeas corpus petition would alleviate the potential
for the DHS to effectively force the detainee to file his or her petition
for habeas relief in a less favorable forum, especially when
implemented in conjunction with conventional venue considerations.
When viewed in light of the Mathews test, it becomes clear that
the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in Armentero that the immediate
custodian rule should be abandoned in the immigration context.
Whereas, the decision by the Roman court did not adequately weigh
the requisite factors prior to reaching its determination, the Armentero
court properly recognized the need for further process and protections
to afford adequate process. The requirement that an immigrant
detainee name her immediate custodian is of marginal benefit to the
government, but significantly compromises an immigrant's ability to
challenge her detention. Furthermore, these realities when combined
with the DHS's penchant for swift and frequent transfer often result in
detainees being ignorant of the identity of the appropriate respondent
128. Id. at 335.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Kahn v. Elwood, 232 F. Supp. 2d 344, 351 (D. Pa. 2002) (responding to a
motion for a stay of removal pending appeal, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
argued that the stay would cause it to suffer "substantial injury," given that it "ha[d] expended
considerable time and expense to schedule [the] Petitioner's removal" and further delay would
increase expenses).
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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to their habeas petition, which, in turn, creates a drain on judicial
resources as courts consider flawed petitions.
After considering the factors enumerated in Mathews v.
Eldridge in light of the current state of immigrant detention, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the use of the immediate custodian rule
for the writs of habeas corpus filed by immigrant detainees does not
contribute to the assurance of justice in detention proceedings.
Because habeas corpus is a necessary check on the power of the DHS
to detain immigrants, its meaning and purpose must be maintained
through the abandonment of the immediate custodian rule in the
immigration context, as held by the Ninth Circuit in Armentero.
The following sections of this article will analyze the interests
held by the immigrant detainees and their weight in relation to the
interests held by the government. As required under the Mathews test,
these articulated interests will be balanced against each other. The
result reveals that the perceived hardship borne by the government is
slight in comparison to the protection afforded for the significant rights
of the immigrant detainees at stake in detention scenarios.
A. First Mathews Factor - Immigrant Detainee Interests
Many of the immigrants bringing habeas corpus petitions
challenging final orders of removal are long-time permanent residents
who, because of convictions for certain crimes, are precluded from
seeking direct appellate review of their final orders under the INA.. 32
Therefore, a habeas corpus petition is often an immigrant detainee's
last opportunity to attempt to remain in this country. Requiring an
immigrant detainee to name the warden of his or her detention center
as immediate custodian instead of the Attorney General fails to
account for the fact that a substantial percentage of the immigrants
currently in DHS custody are held in local jails and private industry
prisons, often in remote locations, that are only affiliated with the DHS
or the Attorney General by contract. Furthermore, the immediate
custodian rule ignores the reality that the DHS frequently uses its
power to transfer immigrant detainees to the point of abusing it, and
unjustly vests the government with complete discretion regarding the
forum for habeas review. Finally, the immediate custodian rule
132. See, e.g., Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
because the crime was one involving moral turpitude the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
appeal under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)).
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impinges on the right to counsel and frustrates practical access to
habeas review.
1. Detention in Remote, Contracted Facilities
The number of immigrants in detention has increased rapidly in
recent years. 133 In 2002, there were approximately 21,000 immigrants
in detention on an average day.' 34 The DHS, formerly the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, uses several types of facilities to hold
immigrant detainees, including DHS owned and operated facilities
known as Service Processing Centers (SPC); centers owned by private
corrections companies; Bureau of Prisons facilities; and local jails
throughout the nation.1 35  Pursuant to section 241(g)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, DHS is required to utilize existing
detention facilities before it may add additional space. 136  The DHS
uses this statutory provision to justify its contracts with private prisons
and rural jails.
More than 60% of the detainees in DHS custody are held in
county jails and state prisons around the country.1 37 As of 2000, "the
[DHS] use[d] more than a third of its $800 million dollar budget to
"rent cells in about 225 jails-most of them in rural counties where
costs are low and there are beds to spare."' 38  For example, in 1995,
133. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Is the Attorney General the Custodian of an INS Detainee?
Personal Jurisdiction and the "Immediate Custodian" Rule in Immigration -Related Habeas
Actions, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 543, 548 (2001-02) (discussing increased rates of
detention and deportation in light of statutory changes).
134. Christopher Nugent, The INS Detention Standards: Facilitating Legal
Representation and Humane Conditions of Confinement for Immigration Detainees, IMMIGR.
CURRENT AWARENESS NEWSL. (Nat'l Immigr. Project & Nat'l Lawyers Guild), Feb. 3, 2003,
WESTLAW, 2003 NIP-ICAN 2.
135. Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]mmigration detainees
are physically detained in a host of institutions, ranging from specialized immigration
detention centers to federal prisons to state and local prisons and jails."); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, LOCKED AWAY: IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN JAILS IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (Sept.
1998) [hereinafter LOCKED AWAY]; Julie Sullivan, Prisons: Conditions Severe Even for Jails,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 10, 2000 at Al (explaining that the INS "farms out more than half the
20,050 people it jails daily to a haphazard network of 1,940 private state prisons and county
jails"), available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/printer/printer.ssf?/special/current/ins/in_12sside 0.frame (last
visited May 26, 2004).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(2) (2000).
137. LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135, at 4.
138. Lori Montgomery, Rural Jails Profiting From INS Detainees: Immigrant Advocates
Object as Counties Like Md. 's Wicomico Contract with U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at
Al.
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Maryland's Wicomico County' 39 needed to raise $65,000 in thirty
days. 14  To acquire the money in time, the warden of the local jail,
John Welch, "'picked up the phone and called the [DHS] and said,
"Send me 70 inmates." And it was done."' 141 This is but one example
of the network of rural jails currently contracting with DHS.1
42
One can only assume that as the number of immigrant
detainees has risen, so has the need for utilizing the space at local and
private jails and prisons. This symbiotic relationship between the local
county jails, private industry prisons and the DHS results in ill-gotten
gains and promotes the frequent transfer of detainees to "needy"
jails. 143 The relationship also results in placing individuals removable
for minor criminal violations "in jail with local criminals accused of
rape, robbery or murder."' 44  Furthermore, due to the increase in
detention, DHS facilities, as well as contracted private and rural jail
spaces, suffer from "[p]oor staffmg, obstructed access to counsel and
the courts, inhumane living conditions, inadequate medical care, and
physical and sexual assault .... ,145
As illustrated above, placement at rural and understaffed
facilities results in immigrant detainees being placed at a disadvantage
in pursuing their cases in court, being placed in potentially dangerous
situations due to their detention with criminals, and having a lack of
meaningful standards for their treatment.
2. The Transfer of Detainees and the Immediate Custodian
Rule Unjustly Vest the Government with Complete Discretion
Regarding the Fora for Habeas Review
139. Wicomico County is located on Maryland's Eastern Shore, and consists of mostly of
farmland.
140. Montgomery, supra note 138.
141. Id. (quoting Warden John Welch).
142. Others include the St. Mary's Correctional Facility in Leonardtown, Maryland, the
Nacogdoches County Jail in Nacogdoches, Texas, and Salem County Correctional Facility in
Woodstown, New Jersey. See LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135, at 17 n.21. The DHS has
become a major force in the private jail industry, resulting in the commodification of detained
immigrants. Michael Welch, The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the
Prison-Industrial Complex, SOC. JUST., Sept. 22, 2000, at 73. As it becomes less committed to
the review of individual claims, DHS' treatment of detainees is increasingly similar that of the
criminal justice system, which uses an actuarial approach to assess and control the risks of
specific subpopulations, such as drug offenders. Id. at 74-75. Detainees are no longer viewed
as treated as individuals, but rather are seen as merely part of groups, such as, Haitians,
Nigerians, or Cubans. Id. Furthermore, the DHS has also increasingly emphasized detention
over its role in providing social service, mirroring developments in criminal justice. Id. at 83.
143. See generally Montgomery, supra note 138.
144. Id.
145. Welch, supra note 142, at 76.
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Under the immediate custodian rule, immigrant detainees must
litigate their habeas corpus actions in the jurisdiction in which they are
held, 146 regardless of the fact that the immigrant's only connection to
the jurisdiction is that he or she was transferred or detained there.
There can be no reasonable grounds to justify forcing immigrant
detainees to litigate their claims in an arbitrary forum chosen by the
government. Rather, in most instances, the most convenient forum
would be in the district where the underlying grounds for removal
occurred, because the writ for habeas is expected to be inextricably
entwined with the substantive grounds for the original removal
order. 14
7
Once an immigrant is in custody, the DHS may, at any time,
transfer an immigrant detainee to another detention facility without
any explanation or advance notice to the immigrant detainee or her
attorney. 148 Transfer may be motivated by any number of influences,
some of which include the availability and cost of bed space in local
149 150jails, security reasons, a desire to punish detainees or to quell
their complaints,' 5' or simply through a request of a detention facility
in need of financial assistance.15 2 The DHS has stated that, "every bed
regardless of where it is situated is national, and it may therefore
transfer detainees anywhere, at anytime.'' 53  According to an
attorney formerly associated with the Florida Immigrant Advocacy
Center, "'[i]t's not unusual to see detainees ... transferred up to 10
times.'154
Under the present immediate custodian rule, the government is
able to abuse its unqualified discretion in transferring detainees to
determine the forum for review of habeas petitions. It has been noted
146. See discussion supra Part II.
147. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493-99 (1973)
(applying traditional venue considerations to determine appropriateness of forum in a §2241
habeas action).
148. See generally Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interference with Detained Aliens' Due
Process Right to Retain Counsel, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2001, 2001 (1987) [hereinafter INS
Transfer Policy].
149. LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135, at 5.
150. Panel Discussion, Perversities and Prospects: Whither Immigration Enforcement
and Detention in the Anti-Terrorism Aftermath?, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (2002)
[hereinafter Panel Discussion].
151. Sullivan, supra note 135; Elizabeth Llorente, Palestinian Detainee Moved From
Passaic Jail to Pa., REC., Feb. 21, 2003, at L04 (noting that various civil rights groups have
charged that the INS transfers detainees who complain about their detention).
152. Montgomery, supra note 138.
153. Robyn Blumner, INS Transfers Mean Detainees Don't Get Legal Help, CAP., Jan. 3,
2003, at Al.
154. Id..
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that the DHS appears to be transferring detainees to one prison in
particular - the Oakdale facility in Louisiana. 155 This large number of
detainees being aggregated to this one facility in the Western District
of Louisiana has frustrated the immigrant detainees' access to the
courts through the writ of habeas corpus. The Fifth Circuit in Emejulu
v. INS156 noted that "the administrative delays in processing
deportations produces an atypical and unanticipated volume of habeas
petitions that is beyond the capability of the district court to process in
a timely fashion."' 157 Furthermore, "[c]ompounding the expenditures
that Congress was concerned with is the expense being borne by the
Western District of Louisiana in processing the flood of habeas
petitions being filed by [the] detainees .... 158
In addition to creating a backlog of habeas petitions, there may
be another, more sinister, reason behind the numerous transfers to
Oakdale. The First Circuit has noted that the Fifth Circuit, where
Oakdale is located, , has set precedents which weigh heavily in the
government's favor, 159 and therefore has seemingly taken a position
against immigrant detainees. According to the court, "[t]he Fifth
Circuit has determined that IIRIRA effectively revoked the district
courts' jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions brought by detained
aliens pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ' 9160 The Fifth Circuit highlighted
the concern that because the DHS has complete authority to transfer
detainees at will, there is the potential for the government to transfer a
detainee seeking habeas corpus review to a jurisdiction where the law
is less favorable to his or her position. The DHS's unfettered control
over the forum in which the petition is heard demands that a check be
placed on that power through increased accountability via its
recognition as an appropriate respondent in habeas petitions.
Opponents may argue that naming the Attorney General as a
respondent in a habeas petition could lead to forum-shopping by
155. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 2000) (observing that the
petitioner was first detained in Boston, then transferred by the INS to the Federal Detention
Center in Oakdale); Nwankwo v. Reno, 828 F. Supp. 171, 172 (D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the
petitioner, after serving his sentence in New York, was transferred to the Federal Deportation
Center in Oakdale); Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 317 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
petitioner served his prison sentence in Ohio, was transferred to the Lexington Federal
Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, and finally was transferred to the Oakdale facility),
cert. denied en banc, No. 02-3253, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1951 (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2004).
156. 989 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1993).
157. Id. at 772.
158. Id. atn.1.
159. Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 694 (1st Cir. 2000).
160. Id. at n.5 (citing Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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immigrant petitioners. Both the Second and the Ninth Circuits,
however, have concluded that application of venue considerations
would alleviate this concern. 16  The considerations listed in section
1391 of the U.S. Code162 include the recognition that venue is
appropriate in the judicial district in which a "substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred."' 16 3 The section
applicable to venue also provides that an alien may be sued in any
district. 64 However, with respect to proceedings addressing habeas
corpus writs containing claims about issues arising from the criminal
charges that led to the decision to remove the immigrant, the judicial
district that was the forum for those underlying proceedings would
clearly be in the best position to fully assess the validity of those
claims. Venue was not designed to give one party to an action an
unfair advantage over the other through an abuse of their position.
Therefore, the immediate custodian rule must be rejected for a more
flexible one that recognizes the need to prevent future forum shopping
by the government.1
65
3. Applying the Immediate Custodian Rule to Immigration
Detainees Impinges on the Right to Counsel and Frustrates
Practical Access to Habeas Review
Because it forces detainees to file habeas petitions in the
district where they are imprisoned, the immediate custodian rule
causes immigrant detainees to face numerous barriers to obtaining
161. See Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A more flexible
approach toward naming a respondent need not open the door to forum shopping by
petitioners. District courts may use traditional venue considerations to control where
detainees bring habeas petitions.") (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 493-94 (1973); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1998)
("Accordingly, there is reason to think that strict application of 'traditional principles of
venue' in alien habeas cases might adequately control the forum shopping in which aliens
might try to engage were the Attorney General to be designated an appropriate respondent.")
(quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 493-94).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
165. See Megan A. Ferstenfeld-Torres, Who Are We to Name?: The Applicability of the
"Immediate-Custodian-As-Respondent" Rule to Alien Habeas Claims Under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, 17 GEO. IMMIG. L. J. 431, 467-68 (2003) ("[B]ecause the INS has unequivocal authority
to transfer detainees in the first instance, it has almost absolute power to engage in de facto
manipulation of the identity of the immediate custodian of any given alien, and thus preempt
his or her ability to select a forum."); Rosenbloom, supra note 133, at 584 ("The immediate
custodian rule in fact presents the true forum-shopping problem, providing the INS with
limitless power to determine the forum.").
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representation, which limits the efficacy of habeas review. Under the
first factor in the Mathews test, access to counsel certainly rises to the
level of a right worthy of added procedural protection. Absent
meaningful access to counsel, the remaining procedure granted to
immigrant detainees is rendered void of any real meaning.
When held in rural jails and private industry prisons, immigrant
detainees often have restricted access to and limited ability to retain
counsel. 166 If an immigrant detainee has family in the country, those
family members usually retain counsel on behalf of the detainees and
act as intermediaries between the detainee and counsel. 167 However,
when detainees are transferred to rural jails outside of their states of
residence, they lose their family-based support network that would
otherwise assist them in retaining counsel. 68  It is difficult for
immigrant detainees to retain counsel on their own, since immigration
attorneys are usually based in urban areas, close to immigrant
communities, but far away from the rural facilities where immigrants
are detained. Even if they manage to retain private counsel, immigrant
detainees have limited ability to meet consult with their attorneys
because of the policies of their particular detention facilities.
Those immigrant detainees who are separated from their
support system and unable to retain private counsel are often left at the
mercy of an overburdened pro bono system, which is generally too
remote to be of any real help. Typically, detainees cannot afford
private counsel, absent help from family members not in custody, and
most pro bono immigration legal services are concentrated in urban
areas near the immigration courts, usually a prohibitive distance from
the rural jails in which the detainees are housed. 169  The largest
166. See generally INS Transfer Policy, supra note 148, at 2002 (discussing the
difficulties of obtaining counsel while detained in isolated detention facilities); Panel
Discussion, supra note 150, at 11 (noting concern expressed by the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees' regarding "frequent transfers..., detention in remote locations.
inadequate law libraries, limited access to outdoor recreation and lack of interpretation.").
167. LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135, at 66.
Incarceration far from friends and family who can locate and pay for
lawyers, frequent transfers from facility to facility, restrictive visitation
policies, and limited telephone access create significant obstacles to
adequate representation. The remote location of local jails-sometimes
hundreds of miles away from an urban center-permits only infrequent
visits by attorneys of record for interviews and case preparation.
Id.
168. Id.; Sullivan, supra note 135 (noting that the INS "[s]hunts people from one jail to
another, often without forwarding their mail, legal paperwork, and personal possessions and
without informing their attorneys or families").
169. LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135, at 66.
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obstacle in receiving such access is the transfer of detainees to remote
rural jails, where there are virtually no pro bono legal services. 70 For
example, the aforementioned detention center in Wicomico County is
116 miles from Washington D.C., and 110 miles from Baltimore,
leaving detainees, who often speak limited or no English, without the
lawyers they need to navigate the complicated deportation
procedure. 
71
The problem of limited legal resources, however, is not only
an issue in rural jails and private prisons. Many DHS detention
centers are placed far away from urban centers, located in areas where
pro bono legal services hardly exist. At the DHS detention facility at
Oakdale, Louisiana, there is rarely "more than one attorney available
at any given time to represent the hundreds of immigrants detained at
the facility on a pro bono basis."' 72 In 1986, a legal services clinic
opened at Oakdale with volunteers working fourteen to sixteen hours a
day, seven days a week. 73 Within one month of its opening, the office
had only been able to visit half of those needing representation; by the
second month, conditions worsened and resulted in asylum
applications being filed with only minimal information. 174 Ultimately,
only two months after opening, the Oakdale legal services office could
no longer accept new clients.' 75 Detainees were left to seek assistance
from pro bono legal service organizations located in New Orleans,
approximately 200 miles away.
Detainees who had counsel in their removal proceeding and
were later transferred face a different set of difficulties. A pattern of
transfers, often without notice to counsel and always without notice to
the detainees' families, can frustrate attorney-client
communications. 177  Also, as the Armentero court observed, ajurisdiction's pro hac vice 178 rules may hinder an out-of-state
170. See generally INS Transfer Policy, supra note 148.
171. Montgomery, supra note 138.
172. INS Transfer Policy, supra note 148, at 2005.
173. Id. at 2006 n.25.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. DHS utilizes a few detention facilities in urban settings such as the Varick
Street Service Processing Center in New York City the Boston Service Processing Center in
Boston, Massachusetts. See INS Detention Centers,
http://www.mendozamueller.com/detention.html (last visited May. 26, 2004) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
177. LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135.
178. "For this occasion or particular purpose; The phrase usu. refers to a lawyer who has
not been admitted to practice in a particular jurisdiction but who is admitted there temporarily
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counsel's ability to represent the petitioner.' 79 Moreover, travel costs
and other expenses could make representation less feasible. 180
Discontinuing the immediate custodian rule and utilizing
traditional venue concerns would solve the problem of obtaining
representation that results from the DHS's limitless transfer policy..
The detainee's family in the jurisdiction where the removal proceeding
took place would be able to assist the detainee in retaining local
counsel. If the detainee were eventually transferred to a different
facility, she would not face the daunting task of securing new counsel
to proceed on her claims.
B. Second Mathews v. Eldridge Factor - Governmental
Interests
When considered in light of the language of the Mathews v.
Eldridge test, the DHS' interests in continuing the immediate
custodian rule are limited. Mathews provides for the consideration of
the "[g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail."18'
DHS could argue that abandoning the immediate custodian rule
would impose a burden on its already limited financial resources by
requiring DHS to appear in all habeas corpus petitions filed by
detainees in the United States. This argument, once examined, appears
to be little more than a "red herring." The burden on the government,
what little there would be, would only consist of transferring the
detainee to the appropriate jurisdiction, and making an appearance in
for the purpose of conducting a particular case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed.
2000).
179. Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058, 1069; see, e.g., M.D. FLA. L.R. 2.02 (out-of-state
attorney must name a local member of the bar to whom all notices and papers may be served
and who will proceed in the event of a default by the out-of-state attorney); W.D. LA. L.R.
83.2.6W (out-of-district attorney may not be sole signatory on pleadings "but [documents
requiring signature of counsel] must bear the signature of local counsel with whom the visiting
attorney is associated"); D. MASS. L. R. 83.5.3(b) (with limited exceptions, counsel cannot
enter an appearance or sign any papers until pro hac vice application has been granted); W.D.
WASH. L.R. GR 2(d) (requiring out-of-district counsel to obtain local co-counsel "who shall
sign all pleadings prior to filing and comply with CR 10(e)"); N.J. L. Civ. R. 101.1(c)(3)
(even if admitted pro hac vice, counsel is not permitted to file papers or enter an appearance).
180. LOCKED AWAY, supra note 135; see also Sullivan, supra note 135 (describing case
in which legal aid organization could not afford to continue representing detainee after he was
transferred from New York to Alabama, and could not communicate for telephone
proceedings).
181. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
2004]
MARGINS
court. The cost of these "burdens" could be defrayed by using existing
structures- the transfer system and DHS's field offices of attorneys.
There would be no need to create new positions or new subdivisions to
respond to habeas petitions; it would simply become another part of a
DHS attorney's routine.
Furthermore, when a court grants an immigrant detainee's writ,
DHS becomes involved in the ensuing legal proceedings anyway.
Naming the Attorney General as respondent in habeas petitions would
actually benefit DHS because DHS would be able to enter the
proceedings at the outset and nip some frivolous petitions in the
proverbial "bud." Abandoning the immediate custodian rule and
naming the Attorney General as the respondent should not be
construed as limiting DHS's ability to transfer detainees as it deems
necessary. On the contrary, it would simply provide a check in the
system to prevent abuse of that power.
Should the DHS argue that it should be afforded certain
privileges in light of the fact that the United States is engaged in a war
on terror, it still could not argue, in good faith, that permitting it to
forum shop furthers its duties and role in that war. Permitting the
government to abuse the system cannot be considered an interest
substantial enough to outweigh the potential erroneous deprivation of
the right to remain in this country.
C. Third Mathewsfactor - Interest of Justice
The need for abandoning the immediate custodian rule
becomes evident when it is analyzed to determine its value in ensuring
that the adjudication of the detainees' interest is just, as required by the
third prong of the Mathews procedural due process test. As illustrated
above, the requirement that an immigrant detainee name her
immediate custodian is of marginal benefit to the government, but
significantly compromises an immigrant's ability to challenge her
detention. One must remember the right at stake in habeas corpus
proceedings in the immigration context. Some immigrant detainees
risked their lives to come to the United States, and many may face
persecution should they be removed to their home countries. In the
face of such potential negative results, permitting the immigrant
detainee to name the Attorney General as the responding party to his
habeas corpus petition plays an important part in ensuring the
appropriate outcome in each case.
[VOL. 4:99
ABANDONING THE IMMEDIATE CUSTODIAN RULE
Discarding the immediate custodian rule in the immigration
context simply causes the immigrant detainee to have the same rights
as criminal defendants utilizing the petition. In criminal cases on the
state level, the petitioner, who is usually incarcerated in the state in
which the crime occurred, names his immediate custodian and his
petition is then heard in the federal district court of the state in which
he was previously tried, a court that is more likely to be familiar with
the facts of his case and the law governing his charge. This is ideally
how the operation of the immediate custodian rule should work. In the
immigration context, however, the immediate custodian rule often
results in the immigrant detainee appearing before a court that has no
knowledge of the facts of her case, has no access to the records from
the other jurisdiction, and then applies precedent that would not apply
in the jurisdiction where the ground for removal occurred and was
litigated. This undermines the oft-quoted interest that the judiciary has
in predictability of outcomes. Fundamental fairness requires that both
petitioners be afforded equal and meaningful opportunity to have the
grounds of their detention re-examined.
Furthermore, these realities, combined with the DHS's
penchant for swift and frequent transfer, often make it difficult for
detainees to know the identity of the appropriate respondent to their
habeas petition. This creates a drain on judicial resources as courts
consider and dismiss flawed petitions, only to have them resubmitted
again, perhaps erroneously. If the immediate custodian rule were to be
held inapplicable in the immigration context, habeas corpus petitions
would be adjudicated more efficiently, thereby conserving scarce
judicial resources and protecting detainees from a seemingly indefinite
period of incarceration.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the balancing test set forth in Mathews, the Ninth Circuit
properly decided Armentero, and the requirements of procedural due
process mandate the abandonment of the immediate custodian rule in
the immigration context. Regardless of the increased deference given
to interests of the political branches in wartime, it is imperative that
immigrant detainees be able to file writs of habeas corpus against the
Attorney General, thereby abandoning the immediate custodian rule.
Failing to alter the rule with respect to immigrant detainees jeopardizes
their ability to exercise their constitutionally protected right to seek a
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writ of habeas corpus in order to obtain freedom from imprisonment, a
right that "lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause]
protects."
18 2
As illustrated by the differing results in Roman and Armentero,
courts are not fully engaging in an explicit Mathews analysis nor are
they completely considering the vast amount of information
concerning the plight of immigrant detainees in the United States. If
they were, courts would be hard pressed not to arrive at the conclusion
that the immigrant detainee rights at stake, as balanced against the
competing interests asserted by the government, require the
abandonment of the immediate custodian rule to ensure the exercise of
meaningful habeas corpus as a final, real protection against abuse at
the hands of a significantly more powerful government. Meaningful
procedure not only benefits the immigrant detainee, but it also
validates Americans' faith in their chosen government.
182. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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